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Abstract. Photon number resolving detectors can enhance the performance of many
practical quantum cryptographic setups. In this paper, we employ a simple method
to estimate the statistics provided by such a photon number resolving detector using
only a threshold detector together with a variable attenuator. This idea is similar in
spirit to that of the decoy state technique, and is specially suited for those scenarios
where only a few parameters of the photon number statistics of the incoming signals
have to be estimated. As an illustration of the potential applicability of the method
in quantum communication protocols, we use it to prove security of an entanglement
based quantum key distribution scheme with an untrusted source without the need of
a squash model and by solely using this extra idea. In this sense, this detector decoy
method can be seen as a different conceptual approach to adapt a single photon security
proof to its physical, full optical implementation. We show that in this scenario the
legitimate users can now even discard the double click events from the raw key data
without compromising the security of the scheme, and we present simulations on the
performance of the BB84 and the 6-state quantum key distribution protocols.
1. Introduction
Among the research performed nowadays in order to increase the secret key rate and
distance that can be covered by quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, one can
distinguish three main work areas which are closely related to each other [1, 2, 3]. On
the one hand, we have the development of new proof techniques, together with better
classical post-processing protocols, that are able to further extend the proven secure
regimes for idealized QKD schemes, typically based on the transmission of two-level
quantum systems (qubits) [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. On the other hand, we
find the continuous improvements that come from the technological side. Especially,
the design of better light sources and better detectors should give us provable secure
communications over a growing distance [14, 15, 16]. Finally, we have the research which
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aims to close the gap between theoretical security concepts for idealized QKD schemes
and their experimental realization [17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23].
The awareness of such a theory-experiment gap was triggered by the important
deviations present in practical QKD setups with respect to their original theoretical
proposal, which usually demands technologies that are beyond our present experimental
capability. Especially, the signal states emitted by the source, instead of being single
photons, are usually weak coherent pulses which can contain more than one photon
prepared in the same polarization state. Now, the eavesdropper (Eve) is no longer
limited by the no-cloning theorem [24], since the multiphoton pulses provide her with
perfect copies of the single photon. In this scenario, she can perform the so-called photon-
number splitting attack [25, 26]. This attack gives Eve full information about the part
of the key generated from the multiphoton signals, without causing any disturbance
in the signal polarization. The use of weak coherent pulses jeopardizes the security
of QKD protocols, and lead to limitations of rate and distance that can be achieved
by these techniques. For instance, it turns out that the BB84 protocol [27] with weak
coherent pulses can give a key generation rate of order O(η2) [20, 21], where η denotes
the transmission efficiency of the quantum channel.
A significant improvement of the secret key rate can be obtained when the hardware
is slightly modified. In particular, by using the so-called decoy state method [17, 18, 19].
In this approach, the sender (Alice) varies, independently and at random, the mean
photon number of each signal state sent to the receiver (Bob) by employing different
intensity settings. Eve does not know the mean photon number of each signal sent.
This means that the gain and the quantum bit error rate (QBER) of each signal can
only depend on its photon number but not on the particular intensity setting used to
generate it. From the measurement results corresponding to different intensity settings,
it turns out that the legitimate users can estimate the gain and the QBER associated
to each photon number state and, therefore, obtain a better estimation of the behavior
of the quantum channel. This translates into an enhancement of the resulting secret
key rate. The decoy state technique has been successfully implemented in several recent
experiments [16, 28, 29, 30, 31], and it can deliver a key generation rate of the same
order of magnitude like single photon sources, i.e., O(η) [17, 18, 19].
The use of photon number resolving (PNR) detectors instead of threshold detectors
can also enhance the performance of many practical QKD setups. For instance, in those
situations where the decoy state method cannot be easily applied. This is the case, for
example, in a QKD scheme with an untrusted source where the legitimate users cannot
control the mean photon number of the signal states emitted. In these scenarios, it
might be still very useful for the legitimate users to have access to the photon number
statistics of the incoming signals. To simplify the security analysis, it is very tempting
to assume a squash model for Alice’s and Bob’s detection setup [32]. This model maps
each incoming signal to a one-photon polarization space followed by a measurement in
this smaller dimensional Hilbert space. The squash model has been recently proven to
be correct for the case of the BB84 protocol [33, 34]. However, in Ref. [34] it was shown
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that the same does not hold, for instance, for the active basis choice measurement in
the 6-state protocol [35].
In this paper, we analyze a simple method to estimate the photon number statistics
provided by a PNR detector using only a practical threshold detector together with
a variable attenuator. The basic idea consists in measuring the incoming light field
with a set of simple threshold detectors with different efficiencies and thus one obtains
more information about the underlying distribution of the photons. This technique
has its origin in the field of quantum metrology as discussed in Refs. [36, 37, 38] and
has been successfully implemented in some recent experiments [39, 40, 41] which show
the practical feasibility of the method. Here we apply it for the first time to various
realistic QKD scenarios. For instance, it can be used to prove security of those QKD
setups that do not have a squash model [34], or in those security proofs that only
require the statistics given by a PNR detector [42]. However if one likes to employ this
technique in the QKD context one has to estimate the photon number statistics under
the worst case assumption for Alice and Bob. Thus the known reconstruction method
from Refs. [37, 38] which considers only a truncated version of the problem (under the
additional constraints of only a finite, small number of experimental runs) cannot be
directly used for the QKD setups. Nevertheless, the central idea of the problem remains
unchanged. In fact, this method can be considered as the decoy state technique applied
to the detector side: If Alice and Bob vary, independently and at random, the detection
efficiency of their apparatus then they can estimate the photon number statistics of
the signals received. Note that the photon number distribution of the incoming signals
cannot depend on the particular efficiency setting used to measure them. Therefore,
from now on, we shall refer to this estimation procedure as detector decoy to emphasize
its connection and applicability to QKD. The detector decoy idea can be employed both
for calibrated and uncalibrated devices [3]. The essential requirement here is that Eve
cannot modify the variable attenuator employed by the legitimate users to vary the
detection efficiency of their setups.
Specifically, we apply the detector decoy method to two different QKD scenarios.
In the first one, we prove the security of an entanglement based QKD scheme with
an untrusted source solely by using this estimation procedure. More precisely, we
investigate the situation where Alice and Bob perform either the BB84 or the 6-state
protocol, and we compare the resulting key rates with those arising from a security proof
based on the squash model assumption [32]. In contrast to this last scenario, now Alice
and Bob can now even sift out the double click events without compromising the security
of the scheme. Note, however, that we compare different situations, since they require
different detection setups. As a second potential application, we analyze an alternative
experimental technique, also based on the detector decoy method, to estimate the photon
number statistics of the output signals in a “Plug & Play” configuration [14, 43, 44].
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we describe in detail the detector
decoy idea to estimate the photon number statistics of an optical signal by means of a
threshold detector combined with a variable attenuator. Next, we apply this method
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to different practical QKD scenarios. In particular, Sec. 3 analyzes the security of an
entanglement based QKD scheme with an untrusted source. Then, in Sec. 4 we propose
an experimental technique to estimate the photon number statistics of the output signals
in a “Plug & Play” configuration. Finally, Sec. 5 concludes the paper with a summary.
2. Estimating photon number statistics
Most of the security proofs for QKD only require the estimation of a few parameters
related with the photon number statistics of the incoming signals. These parameters
suffice to obtain good lower bounds for the achievable secret key rate. Here we
discuss and explain the technique to measure the photon number distribution of an
optical signal by means of a practical threshold detector in combination with a variable
attenuator. As mentioned this idea has been introduced previously in the scientific
literature before, cf. Refs. [36, 37, 38]. The current discussion differs in the particular
way of how one reconstructs part of the photon number distribution from the observed
measurement outcomes; here we need to provide ultimate bounds for certain photon
number parameters, cf. Prop. 2.1, that are valid without any further assumptions on
the signal states. Of course, the photon number distribution can also be obtained by
using directly PNR detectors [45, 46]. This approach would provide Alice and Bob not
only with the distribution of the incoming signals but also with the number of photons
contained in each of them. Unfortunately, most of the methods proposed so far in
the literature to construct this type of detectors result in devices with low detection
efficiencies and which are unable to operate at room-temperatures. An interesting
alternative is that based on detection schemes which use, for instance, time multiplexing
techniques [47, 48]. This method has allowed, for example, a passive decoy selection
in QKD, cf. Ref. [49, 50]. In this last case, however, the achievable photon number
resolution depends on the number of detectors and on the number of spatially, or
temporal, separate bins used.
BS
pn
ρin
B)
η
ρin
QND
A)
Figure 1. Case A) Detection setup which combines a beam splitter of transmittance
η together with an ideal threshold detector. The incoming signal state ρin is given
by Eq. 2. Case B) If one varies the transmittance η of the beam splitter, then the
detection setup given in Case A is equivalent to a quantum non-demolition (QND)
measurement that provides only the photon number statistics of the incoming signals.
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The basic idea of the detector decoy technique can be highlighted with a simple
example. Let the optical signals arriving to a perfect threshold detector be either a single
photon pulse or a strong pulse containing several photons. These two signals will always
produce a single click in the detector. Therefore, in this scenario both events cannot be
distinguished. Suppose now that a beam splitter with very low transmittance is placed
before the detector and the same kind of signals is received once more. Then, the single
photon pulse will produce much less clicks than the strong pulse. In principle, both
events can now be distinguished. That is, by varying the transmittance of the beam
splitter more information about the photon number distribution of the signals received
becomes available.
Let η denote the transmittance of such a beam splitter (Case A in Fig. 1). The
combined detection setup can be characterized by a positive operator value measure
(POVM) which contains two elements, Fvac(η) and Fclick(η), given by [51]
Fvac(η) =
∞∑
n=0
(1− η)nΠn, (1)
and Fclick(η) = 1−Fvac, where Πn represents the projector onto the n-photon subspace.
That is, the outcome of Fvac(η) corresponds to no click in the detector, while the operator
Fclick(η) gives precisely one detection click, which means at least one photon is detected.
Suppose for the moment that the input signal state is of the form
ρin =
∞∑
n=0
pnρn, (2)
where the signals ρn belong to the n-photon subspace.
The probability of getting a click, that we shall denote as pclick(η), depends on the
transmittance η of the beam splitter. It can be calculated as pclick(η) = tr[Fclick(η)ρin].
Similarly, pvac(η) = 1 − pclick(η) represents the probability that the detector does not
click. Using Eq. 1, we find that this last quantity can be expressed as pvac(η) =∑
∞
n=0(1−η)npn. Now one can follow a similar idea to that of the decoy state method. In
particular, if the receiver varies the transmittance η = {η1, . . . , ηM} of the beam splitter
he can generate a set of linear equations with the probabilities pn as the unknown
parameters [36, 37, 38],
pvac(η1) =
∞∑
n=0
(1− η1)npn,
... (3)
pvac(ηM) =
∞∑
n=0
(1− ηM)npn.
From the observed data pvac(η), together with the knowledge of the transmittance η
used, the receiver can solve Eq. 3 and obtain the value of pn. For instance, in the
general scenario where he employs an infinity number of possible decoy transmittances
η ∈ [0, 1], he can always estimate any finite number of probabilities pn with arbitrary
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precision. This result is illustrated as Case B in Fig. 1. On the other hand, if the
receiver is only interested in the value of a few probabilities pn, then he can estimate
them by means of only a few different decoy transmittances, like in the decoy state
method [17, 18, 19, 52]. This last statement is given by Proposition 2.1 for the case
where the receiver only wants to find worst case bounds for the probabilities p0, p1,
and p2. This proposition can straightforwardly be generalized to cover also the case
of any other finite number of probabilities pn. Note, however, that it only constitutes
a possible example of an estimation procedure that provides the exact values of the
probabilities pn in the considered limit. In principle, many other estimation techniques
are also available, like linear programming tools [53] or different ideas from the original
decoy state method [54].
Proposition 2.1. [Finite settings] Consider the set of linear equations given by
f(c) =
∞∑
n=0
cnxn, (4)
where the unknown parameters xn fulfill xn ≥ 0 and
∑
∞
n=0 xn ≤ C for a given constant
C, and where c satisfies c ∈ [0, 1]. Consider now three different settings c0 = 0, c1 and
c2. Then, the unknown variables x0, x1 and x2 satisfy, respectively, x0 = f(c0) = f(0),
l1(c1) =
f(c1)− f(0) (1− c21)− c21C
c1 − c21
≤ x1 ≤ u1(c1) = f(c1)− f(0)
c1
, (5)
and l2(c1, c2) ≤ x2 ≤ u2(c1, c2) with bounds
l2(c1, c2) =
f(c2)− f(0) (1− c32)− u1(c1) (c2 − c32)− c32C
c22 − c32
, (6)
u2(c1, c2) =
f(c2)− f(0)− c2l1(c1)
c22
. (7)
When c1 = ∆ and c2 =
√
∆, the given bounds converge to the exact value of the variables
x1 and x2 in the limit ∆→ 0.
Proof. We present the explicit derivation of the upper bound u1(c1) and of the lower
bound l2(c1, c2). The other bounds can be obtained in a similar way. The basic idea is
as follows: We first upper bound x1 from the knowledge of f(c1); afterwards this result
is used to lower bound x2 given the value of f(c2). Starting with the definition of f(c1)
we obtain
f(c1) = x0 + c1x1 +
∞∑
n=2
cn1xn ≥ f(0) + c1x1, (8)
where we have used the fact that x0 = f(0) and xn ≥ 0. This inequality already gives
the upper bound u1(c1) on x1. To obtain the lower bound l2(c1, c2), note that the other
extra condition on the open parameters xn gives
∞∑
n=N+1
xn ≤ C −
N∑
n=0
xn, ∀N ∈ N. (9)
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Using a similar inequality to that in Eq. 8 for the definition of f(c2) in combination
with the condition given by Eq. 9 we obtain
f(c2) ≤ x0 + c2x1 + c22x2 + c32 (C − x0 − x1 − x2)
≤ f(0)(1− c32) + u1(c1)(c2 − c32) + x2(c22 − c32) + c32C. (10)
In the second step we have employed again the fact that f(0) = x0 together with the
upper bound for x1 ≤ u1(c1). Eq. 10 directly delivers the lower bound given by Eq. 6.
Let us now prove that both bounds converge. The unknown parameters xn are
exactly the Taylor expansion coefficients of the function f(c) evaluated at the point
c = 0, i.e.,
xn =
1
n!
f (n)(0) =
1
n!
dn
dcn
f(c)
∣∣∣
c=0
. (11)
This means that the upper bound u1(c1) becomes exact if one finds the appropriate
setting to estimate the first derivative. Choosing c1 = ∆ directly gives
lim
∆→0
u1(∆) = lim
∆→0
f(∆)− f(0)
∆
= f (1)(0) = x1. (12)
For the lower bound l2(c1, c2) one has to perform the limit c1 → 0 prior to c2 → 0.
Hence, one selects the setting c2 =
√
∆ > ∆ = c1. Using the Taylor expansion series,
f(c1) = f(∆) ≈ f(0) + f (1)(0)∆, (13)
f(c2) = f(
√
∆) ≈ f(0) + f (1)(0)
√
∆+
1
2
f (2)(0)∆, (14)
we obtain
lim
∆→0
l2(∆,
√
∆) = lim
∆→0
1
1−√∆
{
1
2
f (2)(0) +
√
∆
[
f(0)− C + f (1)(0)]}
=
1
2
f (2)(0) = x2. (15)
This proves that also the lower bound on x2 becomes exact in the considered limit.
For the further discussion we shall assume that one can always obtain the exact values
of the probabilities pn, hence we will ignore any finite size effects from now on.
So far, we have analyzed the case of an ideal threshold detector. When the detector
has some finite detection efficiency ηdet and shows some noise in the form of dark counts
which are, to a good approximation, independent of the incoming signals, such a detector
can be described by a beam splitter of transmittance ηdet combined with a noisy detector
[55]. In this scenario the argumentation presented above still holds, and the detector
decoy method can also be used in the calibrated device scenario. Note that the operator
Fvac(η) is now given by
Fvac(η) = (1− ǫ)
∞∑
n=0
(1− ηηdet)nΠn, (16)
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where ǫ represents the probability to have a dark count. In this case, pvac(η) has the
form
pvac(η) = (1− ǫ)
∞∑
n=0
(1− ηηdet)npn. (17)
Again, if one varies η then, from the measured data pvac(η) together with the knowledge
of the parameters η, ηdet and ǫ, the receiver can deduce mathematically‡ the value of
the probabilities pn.
The results provided in this section rely on the description of the detectors given
by Eq. 1 and Eq. 16. However, there are many different ways to model the exact
behavior of an imperfect detector, and quite often the model is adapted to the explicit
situation for which one wants to use the calculated data. The probability of a no click
outcome given by Eq. 3 and Eq. 17 describes the typical QKD situation quite accurate
(see, e.g., Ref. [56]). Of course, whenever this situation changes the exact analysis
need to be adapted. Nevertheless, the main idea behind the detector decoy method
stays invariant. Via the observations on several different input distributions {pn(η)},
that directly depend on the incoming photon number distribution {pn} by means of an
explicit, known transformation rule (binomial transformation in the case of the beam
splitter) one can obtain more information about the incoming photon statistics.
3. Entanglement based QKD schemes with an untrusted source
In this section we combine the detector decoy idea with the security statement for an
entanglement based QKD scheme with an untrusted source. The schematic setup of the
experiment is shown in Fig. 2. The source, which is assumed to be under Eve’s control, is
placed between the two receivers. In the ideal case, this source produces entangled states
that are sent to Alice and Bob. The entanglement is contained in the polarization degree
of freedom of the light field. This means that at least two different optical modes have to
be considered for each side. On the receiving side, we assume that both measurement
devices only act onto these two modes. For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to the
familiar active polarization measurement setup, in which each party actively chooses
the measurement basis β. In the BB84 protocol each receiver can choose between two
different basis, while in the 6-state protocol all three different polarization axis can be
selected. Each measurement device consists of a polarizing beam splitter that spatially
separates the two incoming modes according to the chosen polarization basis β, followed
by two threshold detectors on the two different output modes of the beam splitter.
The analysis for other measurement devices, like for example a passive measurement
setup is completely analogous. Entanglement based schemes constitute a very promising
alternative to implement QKD over long distances. In fact, they hold the theoretical
‡ Note that the convergence result given in Proposition 2.1 does not apply directly to this scenario.
However, it is still correct if one ignores the detector efficiency part. This is the case considered in
Sec. 3, when we analyze the security of QKD schemes.
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distance record for a QKD scheme without quantum repeaters so far, cf. the simulation
in Ref. [32]. This type of protocols have been successfully implemented in many different
recent experiments (See, e.g., Ref. [57, 58, 59] and references therein.), and they are a
suitable candidate to realize earth-satellite QKD links [60]. For more details on the
setup, or on the measurement apparatus, we refer the reader to Refs. [32, 56].
Untrusted
Source
Eve
Alice
β β
Bob
A B
Figure 2. Schematic diagram of an entanglement based QKD scheme with an
untrusted source for the case of an active choice of the measurements basis βA, βB
respectively.
Section 3.1 includes the security analysis for an entanglement based QKD scheme.
We follow the security proof technique provided in Ref. [12, 13, 23]. Using this approach
allows us to directly pinpoint the usefulness of the detector decoy method in the security
proof. The main result of Sec. 3.1 is given by Eq. 29, which shows that the final lower
bound on the secret key rate only depends on a few essential parameters of the system.
Then, in Sec. 3.2 we employ the detector decoy idea to estimate these parameters for
the active measurement scheme. Finally, Sec. 3.3 contains the simulation of a real QKD
experiment. There, we compare the detector decoy method with other proof techniques.
3.1. Secret key rate
We discuss the security level in the case of collective attacks. More precisely, we assume
that the three parties Alice, Bob and Eve share an unlimited number of copies of the
same state |Ψ〉ABE. Once Alice and Bob have received their part of the quantum state,
they measure it to obtain information about the state ρAB = trE (|Ψ〉ABE〈Ψ|). The
POVMs used by Alice and Bob are denoted, respectively, as {FAi } and {FBj }. They
contain all the measurement operators that Alice and Bob perform during the protocol,
i.e., they also include the detector decoy measurements. These additional measurements
enable the legitimate users to estimate some of the crucial parameters of the key rate
formula with high confidence. Let us further assume that all the measurement operators
are invariant under a projection measurement of the total number of photons [56]. That
is, each of the elements FAi or F
B
j satisfies
Fi =
∞∑
n=0
ΠnFiΠn. (18)
Using this assumption, one can consider a slightly different, but completely equivalent,
scenario for the distribution of the quantum states. The new scenario has the advantage
that it allows a direct application of a known key rate formula based on unidirectional
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classical error correction and privacy amplification [12, 13, 23]. Proposition 3.1, however,
holds independently of whether we restrict ourselves to unidirectional or bidirectional
classical communication protocols in the post-processing stage.
Proposition 3.1. Whenever Alice and Bob use photon number diagonal measurement
devices, then the secret key rate in the following two scenarios is the same:
(i) Eve distributes pure quantum states |Ψ〉ABE from a given set P which contains
the purifications of the states ρAB = trE(|Ψ〉ABE〈Ψ|) that are compatible with the
observed measurement data.
(ii) Alice, Bob and Eve share tripartite states ρABE = trR(|Φ〉ABER〈Φ|) ∈ S which
originate from a four-party state of the form
|Φ〉ABER =
∞∑
n,m=0
√
pnm|φnm〉ABE|n,m〉R, (19)
where |φnm〉ABE represents a state that contains n photons in the mode destined to
Alice and m photons in the mode for Bob, and where |n,m〉R denotes an inaccessible
shield system that records the photon number information of Alice and Bob’s signals.
The set of possible tripartite states S contains all such states for which the bipartite
(photon-number diagonal) states ρAB = trER(|Φ〉ABER〈Φ|) are compatible with the
observations.
Proof. We show that for any state |Ψ〉ABE ∈ P chosen from the first scenario, there is a
particular three party state ρABE ∈ S from the second case such that Eve’s position, once
Alice and Bob have performed their measurements, is completely equivalent. The reverse
direction of this statement holds trivially since S ⊂ P. Note that Eve’s eavesdropping
capabilities are completely determined by the collection of conditional states ρijE and
their corresponding probabilities pij , both defined via the relation
pijρ
ij
E = trAB
(
FAi ⊗ FBj σABE
)
, (20)
when Alice, Bob, and Eve share a state σABE. Let us start with the first case, where
σABE = |Ψ〉ABE〈Ψ| with |Ψ〉ABE ∈ P. Using Eq. 20 and Eq. 18 we arrive at
pijρ
ij
E =
∑
n,m
trAB
(
ΠAnF
A
i Π
A
n ⊗ΠBmFBj ΠBm |Ψ〉ABE〈Ψ|
)
=
∑
n,m
pnm trAB
(
FAi ⊗ FBj |φnm〉ABE〈φnm|
)
. (21)
In the second line we define ΠAn ⊗ΠBm|Ψ〉ABE =
√
pnm|φnm〉ABE. To compare it with the
second scenario we select |Φ〉ABER arising from the state |Ψ〉ABE via a coherent photon
number measurement. Its outcome is stored in the additional register system R and the
state is given by
|Φ〉ABER =
∑
n,m
ΠAn ⊗ ΠBm|Ψ〉ABE|0〉R =
∑
n,m
√
pnm|φnm〉ABE|n,m〉R. (22)
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Using σABE = trR (|Φ〉ABER〈Φ|) in Eq. 20 directly delivers the same result as Eq. 21.
This finally proves the proposition.
Next we focus on a security proof that only requires direct classical communication
in the reconciliation part of the protocol. More precisely, we apply the secret key rate
formula derived in the recent security proof presented in Refs. [12, 13, 23]. It relies
on Alice, Bob, and Eve sharing signal states of the form given by Eq. 19. Once the
legitimate users have measured their part of ρABE = trR(|Φ〉ABER〈Φ|), they only have
access to their classical outcomes which are stored in registers X and Y respectively. On
the contrary, Eve still has at her disposal a quantum state. This scenario is described
by the so-called ccq state ρXYE =M(ρABE) that results from the map
ρABE 7→ ρXYE =M(ρABE) =
∑
i,j
pij|i, j〉XY〈i, j| ⊗ ρijE , (23)
where the probabilities pij and the conditional states ρ
i,j
E are defined like in Eq. 20 by
setting σABE = ρABE. According to Refs. [23], the secret key rate, that we shall denote
as R, satisfies
R ≥ inf
ρABE∈S
∞∑
n,m=0
gnmS(X|E, n,m)− gH(X|Y ). (24)
The infimum runs over all possible tripartite states ρABE that belong to the class S
defined in Proposition 3.1. Here H(X|Y ) stands for the conditional Shannon entropy
of Alice’s random variable X conditioned on Bob’s random variable Y . This part
accounts for the error correction step of the protocol and it is independent of the chosen
tripartite state ρABE ∈ S. In order to compute the conditional von Neumann entropies
S(X|E, n,m) describing Eve’s information about Alice’s raw key, we first calculate
the ccq states for the definite photon number states |φnm〉ABE as they appear in the
decomposition ρABE =
∑
n,m pnm|φnm〉ABE〈φnm| ∈ S. Let us denote these conditional
ccq states as ρnmXYE =M(|φnm〉ABE〈φnm|). From the definition of the conditional entropy
we obtain S(X|E, n,m) = S(ρnmXE) − S(ρnmE ), where S(ρ) denotes the von Neumann
entropy of a generic quantum state ρ. The remaining parameters that appear in Eq. 24
are the overall gain g and the individual gains gnm, i.e., the probability that Alice and
Bob obtain an overall conclusive result when n and m photons are detected on each side
respectively. These parameters can be written as
gnm = pnmYnm, (25)
g =
∑
n,m
gnm, (26)
with the conditional yields Ynm defined as the probability that both parties
obtain a conclusive outcome conditioned on the fact that they received a state
trE(|φnm〉ABE〈φnm|).
The detector decoy idea does not imply any change in the underlying security
proof. In fact, one could even improve the lower bound on the secret key rate formula
given in Eq. 24 by including local randomization steps [12, 13, 61, 62] or by allowing
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several rounds of classical bidirectional communication [23]. The main advantage of
the detector decoy method is that it allows Alice and Bob to acquire more information
about the class S over which they have to perform the optimization. As explained in
the next subsection, one can in principle obtain the full statistics that PNR detectors
could give. Note, however, that when Alice and Bob use PNR detectors they also have
single shot resolution. Still, to have access to the statistics of the arriving signals allows
the legitimate users to gain more knowledge about Eve’s information on the raw key.
Thus a smaller amount of privacy amplification is needed, and consequently one obtains
more secret key.
One can further simplify the lower bound on the secret key rate formula such that
only a few parameters need to be estimated, cf. Ref. [23]. The conditional entropies
satisfy H(X|n,m) ≥ S(X|E, n,m) ≥ 0 for all photon numbers n and m. This means
that the secret key rate R can always be lower bounded by restricting the sum in Eq. 24
to any of its items. For instance, one can select the single photon and the vacuum
contributions only, and obtains
R ≥ inf
ρABE∈S
∞∑
m=0
g0mS(X|n = 0, m) + g11S(X|E, n = 1, m = 1)
− gH(X|Y ). (27)
So far we have not considered any explicit QKD scheme yet. In the following we
restrict ourselves to the BB84 and the 6-state protocols, since they allow us to express
both entropies by means of quantities that are directly observable. Moreover, and
for simplicity, let us assume that the sifted key is only composed by those events for
which Alice and Bob have used their normal detection device, i.e., all possible decoy
outcomes are considered as inconclusive results and they are only used to estimate the
class S. Similarly, all the no click outcomes and all detection events where Alice and
Bob employed different basis choices are discarded as well. In the case of double clicks
two options are possible: Either they are discarded as well, or one assigns at random
one of the two conclusive outcomes “0” or “1” [56]. As a result, Alice and Bob are left
with binary values whenever they consider an outcome pair as conclusive. As shown in
Ref. [12, 13], both parties can randomly flip their bit values together, which results in an
overall symmetric error rate that gives H(X|Y ) = h2(Q), where h2 denotes the binary
entropy. Any conclusive result on Alice’s side that originates from a vacuum input
contains no information for the eavesdropper [63]. If we assume that these events are
completely unbiased we obtain S(X|E, n = 0, m) = 1 for all m. This means that Alice
and Bob do not need to perform any privacy amplification on all these outcomes, but
note as well that they do not provide any key information because of the error correction
part in the formula. The total vacuum gain is given by g0 =
∑
m g0m. The conditional
von Neumann entropy from the single photon contribution can always be lower bounded
by the completely symmetric case, which gives S(X|E, n = 1, m = 1) ≥ f(Q11), where
f denotes a convex function that depends on the chosen protocol, and Q11 represents
the conditional single photon QBER that one observes with perfect detectors. For the
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two considered protocols this function f takes the form §
f(x) =
{
1− h2(x) BB84,
1 + h2(x)− h2(3x2 )− 3x2 log2(3) 6-state.
(28)
Let gmin11 and g
min
0 denote lower bounds on the single photon and vacuum gain
respectively, while Qmax11 represents an upper bound to the maximal attainable value of
the single photon QBER, of all states compatible with the class S. With this notation,
the secret key rate satisfies
R ≥ gmin0 + gmin11 f(Qmax11 )− gh2(Q), (29)
with the distinction between the BB84 and the 6-state protocol being only in the function
f given by Eq. 28. Note that the gains g11, g0 and g depend on the choice of which
outcomes are considered as conclusive. This decision includes as well the overall sifting
effect. Let q denote the probability that both parties use their normal detection device
and they measure in the same basis. Then, using an asymmetric basis choice in the
setup in combination with a very rarely switching to the decoy measurement, this overall
sifting factor q can be made arbitrary close to unity [64] and thus we can drop it in the
evaluation section.
3.2. Detector decoy estimation
In this section we apply the detector decoy method to the active measurement setup as
it is used in the usual BB84 or the 6-state protocol, and we show how Alice and Bob
can estimate the essential quantities to evaluate Eq. 29. That is, the vacuum gain g0,
the single photon gain g11 and the conditional quantum bit error rate Q11 from perfect
detectors.
The discussion starts with the typical model of an imperfect threshold detector
which shows some noise in the form of dark counts as given by Eq. 17 with η = 1.
Furthermore we require that Alice’s and Bob’s detectors have equal (and constant)
detector inefficiency; otherwise this opens the possibility for powerful new eavesdropping
attacks [65, 66] and other techniques have to be applied [67, 68]. Under this assumption
it is a common technique to include the inefficiency of the detectors into the action
of the quantum channel, and one performs the analysis with a threshold detector
model of perfect efficiency. If one can prove security without knowing the exact
detector efficiency, then one automatically also shows security with this particular extra
§ Let us mention two important points here. Because of convexity of both functions one could
alternatively use the actual, single photon QBER as an argument of the lower bound functions.
This situation corresponds to the case in which one assumes the uncalibrated device scenario for the
evaluation of the privacy amplification part. However, if one takes into account any imperfections from
the actual detection device, then one could even enhance the actual lower bound f . For example, if
one considers a dark count model that randomly flips the bit value on Alice side (dark counts produce
double clicks which are randomly assigned afterwards) this actually reduces Eve’s information on the
raw key and hence the privacy amplification part [12, 13]. Nevertheless we shall ignore this effect in
our discussion.
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knowledge. Suppose that both threshold detectors on each side have equal dark count
probabilities. The POVM elements for the active measurement choice β are given by
[56]
F0 = (1− ǫ)
∞∑
n=1
|n, 0〉β〈n, 0|+ ǫ(1− ǫ)|0, 0〉〈0, 0|, (30)
F1 = (1− ǫ)
∞∑
n=1
|0, n〉β〈0, n|+ ǫ(1− ǫ)|0, 0〉〈0, 0|, (31)
together with Fvac = (1− ǫ)2|0, 0〉〈0, 0| and FD = 1− Fvac − F0 − F1, with FD denoting
the operator associated with double click events. Here |n, 0〉β and |0, n〉β refer to
the corresponding two-mode Fock state in the chosen polarization basis β. Although
we restrict ourselves to this particular model, the analysis that follows can also be
straightforwardly adapted for the calibrated device scenario.
Let us begin by analyzing the single photon gain g11. Consider a simple setup where
Alice and Bob insert only a single beam splitter in front of their measurement devices.
This beam splitter is of course not assigned to the quantum channel. This scenario is
illustrated in Fig 3, where the transmittance of Alice and Bob’s beam splitter is denoted
as ηA and ηB respectively. This setup has the advantage that both legitimate users only
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Figure 3. Schematic diagram of the first detector decoy setup considered. Alice and
Bob place a single beam splitter, with transmittance ηA and ηB respectively, in front
of their detection device.
need to collect the count rates for one variable beam splitter per site, but it still enables
Alice and Bob to obtain the overall photon number distribution pnm of the incoming
signals. With this information they can directly compute the individual gain of the
single photon contribution g11 for the considered scenarios. For this detection device
the overall “no click” operator on Alice’s side becomes
FAvac(ηA) = (1− ǫ)2
∞∑
n=0
(1− ηA)nΠAn , (32)
where the projector onto the n-photon subspace is given by
ΠAn =
n∑
k=0
|k, n− k〉β〈k, n− k|. (33)
Note that this operator is independent of the chosen measurement basis ~β, and hence
we omit this label in the following whenever it is redundant. A similar expression holds
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for Bob’s measurement operator FBvac(ηB). Suppose that both parties receive now the
generic input state ρAB, then they observe a no click outcome with probability
pABvac(ηA, ηB) = (1− ǫ)4
∞∑
n,m=0
(1− ηA)n(1− ηB)mpnm, (34)
where the photon number distribution pnm is given by pnm = trAB(Π
A
n ⊗ ΠBmρAB).
Now, if Alice and Bob vary the transmittance of their inserted beam splitters, they
can generate a whole set of linear equations similar to those given by Eq. 34, in which
the photon number distribution pnm appears as the open parameter. With this set of
equations the whole distribution becomes accessible to Alice and Bob, however if they
are only interested in the single photon probability p11 then the three different settings
of Proposition 2.1 are already enough. Next, let us compute the single photon gain
g11 for two different scenarios. Whenever Alice and Bob randomly assign bit values to
their double click outcomes any single photon state will necessarily produce a conclusive
outcome. In the second case, we consider that only single clicks contribute to the raw
key rate. Here the individual gain is slightly lower than in the first situation since a
single photon can trigger a double click event because of dark counts. The two different
individual gains are given, respectively, by
g11,d = p11, (35)
g11,s = (1− ǫ)2p11, (36)
where the subscripts “d” (with double clicks) and “s” (single clicks only) label the two
different cases. Let us mention that the idea of obtaining the impinging photon number
statistics with only one variable beam splitter can as well be applied to other photon
number preserving linear networks, since the probability to obtain an overall no click
outcome in the all the threshold detectors after such a network can always be calculated
by replacing the whole network by only one such threshold detector.
The vacuum gain g0 represents a direct observable quantity even without the
detector decoy method. It only relies on the fact that one can obtain the statistics
of a perfect threshold detector from the observed data of a detector which has dark
counts [69]. Suppose that Bob considers a specific measurement outcome k which he
can perfectly distinguish with his measurement device, and the corresponding POVM
element is denoted by FBk . Then, the probability that Alice registers no click at all while
Bob sees this specific outcome is given by
pABvac,k = (1− ǫ)2 trAB
(|0, 0〉A〈0, 0| ⊗ FBk ρAB) = (1− ǫ)2p0k. (37)
Since both parties can have access to the dark count probability ǫ they can directly
use Eq. 37 to compute the probability p0,k from perfect threshold detectors. Using this
value directly allows to infer the vacuum gain for the two different scenarios as
g0,d = [1− (1− ε)2]p0,d, (38)
g0,s = 2ǫ(1− ǫ)p0,s. (39)
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The resolved single photon QBER Q11 is inaccessible with the simple detector
decoy setup presented above. We can consider a more complicated setup in which
a variable beam splitter is place in front of each threshold detector. This scenario
is depicted in Fig. 4. Now Alice and Bob can adjust the transmittance of their two
beam splitters ~ηA = (ηA,1, ηA,2) and ~ηB = (ηB,1, ηB,2) respectively. Although, from a
practical point of view, this scenario is less attractive than the previous one—it requires
a more complicated statistical analysis—it is interesting on a conceptual level since it
can provide Alice and Bob with the same statistics like PNR detectors. Obviously all
the results from the simple setup apply if one selects ηA,1 = ηA,2 = ηA and similar for
Bob’s side. Now the POVM element for the overall no click outcome on Alice’s side is
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Figure 4. Schematic diagram of the second scenario analyzed, where Alice and Bob
place a variable beam splitter in front of every threshold detector.
given by
FAvac,βA(~ηA) = (1− ǫ)2
∞∑
k,l=0
η¯kA,1η¯
m
A,2|k, l〉βA〈k, l|, (40)
where we use the abbreviation η¯ = 1 − η. A similar expression can be obtained for
FBvac,βB(~ηB). In contrast to the first measurement device analyzed, now the no click
outcome depends on the chosen polarization basis ~β = (βA, βB). The probability of the
combined “no click” outcome in Alice’s and Bob’s side can be written as
pAB
vac,~β
(~ηA, ~ηB) = (1− ǫ)4
∞∑
k,l,r,s=0
η¯kA,1η¯
l
A,2η¯
r
B,1η¯
s
B,2 q~β(k, l; r, s), (41)
where the probabilities q~β(k, l; r, s) have the form
q~β(k, l; r, s) = trAB
(
|k, l〉βA〈k, l| ⊗ |r, s〉βB〈r, s| ρAB
)
. (42)
These probabilities coincide with the ones provided by PNR detectors. Using again the
idea of different settings for the transmittance of the adjustable beam splitters one can
generate more linear equations of the form given by Eq. 41. Consequently, the photon
number resolved statistics q~β(k, l, r, s) become accessible to Alice and Bob. With this
resolved distribution at hand it is straightforward to compute the single photon QBER
Q~β,11 that Alice and Bob would observe using perfect detectors. It is determined by
p11Q~β,11 = q~β(1, 0; 0, 1) + q~β(0, 1; 1, 0). (43)
Note that one has to use the symmetrized single photon QBER in the lower bound
formula given by Eq. 29.
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3.3. Evaluation
In this part we evaluate the lower bound on the secret key rate for the different decoy
detection schemes presented in the last subsection. Additionally, we compare it with a
security proof that relies on the validity of the squash model; for a different comparison
between the squash model and an alternative estimation procedure not based in this
last paradigm see also Ref. [70]. We assume that all relevant parameters that appear in
the lower bound formula can be estimated precisely, i.e., we ignore any statistical effect
of an estimation procedure that uses only a few number of decoy settings.
Suppose that the observed data originate from a pumped type-II down conversion
source. The states emitted by this type of source can be written as [71]
|Ψsource〉AB =
∞∑
n=0
√
pn|Φn〉AB, (44)
where the probability distribution pn is given by
pn =
(n+ 1)λn
(1 + λ)n+2
. (45)
The parameter λ is related with the pump amplitude of the laser and determines the
mean photon pair number per pulse as µ = 2λ. Each signal state |Φn〉AB contains
exactly 2n photons; n of them travel to Alice and the other n to Bob. These states are
of the form
|Φn〉AB =
n∑
m=0
(−1)m√
n+ 1
|n−m,m〉A|m,n−m〉B, (46)
where we have used the standard basis on each side, i.e., βA = βB = z. When n = 1, the
signal state in Eq. 46 becomes the EPR state, which admits perfect anticorrelations in
all directions‖. When n ≥ 2, the states |Φn〉AB representW -states. That is, even if Alice
and Bob measure them along the same direction they might observe double clicks. In
fact, the biggest contribution in the observed QBER stems from the multiphoton pairs.
For instance, if the signal |Φn=2〉 loses only one photon in the channel, then the error rate
of the resulting state (although still entangled) is already about¶ 16.6%. This QBER
is above the threshold error rate allowed by the one-way security proof employed in the
previous section, even assuming a single qubit realization. This means, in particular,
that the expected average mean photon number λ which optimizes the secret key rate
in the long distance limit is quite low, and one does not expect a security proof which
enables to drive the source with a much higher mean photon number.
To generate the observed data of an experiment that uses this kind of source we
employ the following procedure: Since the loss is the predominant factor in the error
rate and in the overall gain, we assume that the state emitted by the source passes first
‖ If Alice and Bob employ the measurement devices from Eqs. 30, 31, then they would always observe
anticorrelated outcomes. Hence, one of the parties has to interchange the observed data “0” ↔ “1”.
¶ Note, however, that there are different, more complicated measurement techniques that can be more
robust against particle loss from a PDC source [72].
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through a lossy, but otherwise error-free channel. Such a channel is characterized by the
loss coefficient α and the total distance l. We include as well in the channel the effect of
the detector efficiency ηdet of the measurement device. Hence, the overall transmission
in the optical line towards Alice becomes
ηA = ηdet10
−
αl
10 = 10−
dbA
10 , (47)
and determines the overall loss coefficient dbA. A similar relation holds also for
the channel towards Bob. The total loss between both parties is characterized by
dbtot = dbA + dbB. After the lossy channel, we include the effect of the misalignment
and the dark counts of the detectors in the observed data. The misalignment varies
slightly the polarization of the incoming light field. This effect changes over time and
it is assumed to be uncontrollable. Averaging it results in an action similar to that
of a depolarizing channel. Specifically, we consider the following misalignment model:
Every time a single photon arrives at the detection device it triggers the correct detector
with probability (1− e), while with probability e it changes its polarization and triggers
the wrong detector. When more photons enter the detection apparatus this effect is
assumed to occur independently for every single photon and hence it can also change
the probability to observe a double click. To conclude, we assume as well that Alice’s and
Bob’s detectors suffer from dark counts as described in the previous subsection. Dark
counts are typically the crucial parameter that limit the distance of a QKD scheme.
Next, we compare the different lower bounds on the secret key rate for the various
scenarios considered, which again are distinguished by the subscripts “s” and “d”
depending on the double click choice. In the simple detector decoy setup the resolved
error rate is not directly accessible. Still, one can upper bound it via a worst case
assumption. That is, we consider that all errors originate from the single photons only.
In the single click case this upper bound, denoted as Q11,s, is given by
+
Q11,s =
1
g11,s
(
Qsgs − g01
2
)
≥ Q11. (48)
A similar relation gives the upper bound Q11,d for the double click case. On the other
hand, in the detector decoy scheme which has two variable beam splitters in each side the
conditional quantum bit error rate Q11 is equal to the hypothetical QBER arising with
perfect detectors, independently of the chosen scenario. The different lower bounds are
illustrated in Tab. 1. This table also includes the case where both parties employ perfect
PNR detectors. This type of detectors allows them to condition the error correction on
the photon number observed. This way, the term H(X|Y ) which appears in Eq. 24 can
be changed by the conditional term
∑
gnmH(X|Y, n,m). The lower bound contained in
Tab. 1 corresponds to the case where single click events are the only conclusive outcomes.
A fair comparison with a security proof based on the squash model is only possible if
one employs the result from Refs. [33, 34] to further extend the validity of the squash
+ From this estimation one could even try to calculate out the dark count probability of the detectors.
However, we shall ignore this effect here.
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Scenario Lower bound
Updated Squash g˜0 + g˜11[1− h2(Q˜11)]− gdh2(Qd)
Double g0,d + g11,df(Q11)− gdh2(Qd)
Double + Bound g0,d + g11,df(Q11,d)− gdh2(Qd)
Single g0,s + g11,sf(Q11)− gsh2(Qs)
Single + Bound g0,s + g11,sf(Q11,s)− gsh2(Qs)
PNR p11[f(Q11)− h2(Q11)]
Table 1. Different lower bounds on the secret key rate for the various scenarios
considered with active basis choice measurements.
model to the situation where Alice’s and Bob’s detectors have dark counts; otherwise
one loses the vacuum gain. The exact target measurements are given by Eqs. 30, 31 with
n = 1 and where every double click is randomly assigned to one bit value. As a result,
we obtain the lower bound formula given in Tab. 1 (“Updated squash”) in which g˜0 and
g˜11 denote, respectively, the squashed vacuum gain and the corresponding single photon
gain, while Q˜11 stands for the conditional QBER on the squashed single photons. Since
the squash model does not exist for the active 6-state protocol∗ [34], here one cannot
choose the function f .
For the simulation we consider an asymmetric distance scenario, since this situation
optimizes the gain of the detector decoy idea over a security proof that relies on the
squash model. In particular, we assume that Bob is much closer to the source than
Alice. Such a situation might appear often in a QKD network, where certain users
can be further away from the relay stations than others. The results for the BB84 and
the 6-state protocol are shown, respectively, in Fig. 5 and in Fig. 6. The first case
always corresponds to the situation where Alice and Bob place a single beam splitter in
front of their detection device, while the second case represents the scenario where the
legitimate users place a variable beam splitter in front of every threshold detector. The
position of the source is denoted by a black square and is kept constant at a dbB = 3
loss distance, so we only increase the distance towards Alice. For each lower bound we
perform an optimization over the free parameter λ that corresponds to the mean photon
pair number.
It is worth mentioning that the squash model delivers a higher lower bound on the
secret key rate than that corresponding to the detector decoy method in the double
click case. This seems surprising at first since the detector decoy idea provides the
∗ All formulae in Tab. 1 are for active basis choice measurements. In particular in a passive basis
choice selection the results of the squash model change. One could at least discard double or multiclick
events between different basis outcomes, and moreover a squash model exists for the passive 6-state
protocol.
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Figure 5. Different lower bounds on the secret key rate for the simple decoy detection
setup shown in Fig. 3 with ǫ = 10−6 and e = 0.03. The inset figure shows the value
for the optimized parameter λ of the source.
exact knowledge of all important single photon parameters. Note, however, that in
the discussion which leaded to the lower bound formula given by Eq. 27 we restricted
ourselves to only draw a secret key from the single photon contribution. In contrast, the
squash model does not necessarily constrain the parties to obtain a secret key from the
single photon contribution only, but instead attempts to even draw a secret key from the
multiphoton events. In this sense, one can consider the squash model as a “calculation
method” that allows to lower bound the amount of privacy amplification necessary for
the multiphoton events by an equal amount of privacy amplification “calculated” on a
hypothetical single photon state. Hence using the squash model directly lower bounds
the key rate from Eq. 24. On the contrary, the detector decoy idea provides a slightly
higher secret key rate than the squash model when Alice and Bob discard their double
click events. Note that this action is not possible with the squash model assumption.
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Figure 6. Different lower bounds on the secret key rate for the refined decoy detection
setup shown in Fig. 4 with ǫ = 10−6 and e = 0.03. The inset figure shows the value
for the optimized parameter λ of the source.
For the asymmetric distance scenario, this fact allows the two parties to drive the source
with a slightly higher mean photon number, since the double clicks that occur frequently
on the side closer to the source can be discarded from the error rate. See inset plots
of the optimized mean photon number in Figs. 5, 6. In the squash model one has to
keep the double click rate low on both sides, because the penalty in the error rate for
each double clicks is 50%. Therefore, one has to use a lower mean photon number.
This effect decreases with the distance, and in the long distance limit this advantage
vanishes. Moreover, note that by adding the vacuum gain in the lower bound formula
the resulting maximal achievable distance is shifted by around db = 10.
We have shown that the detector decoy idea provides a simple method to adapt a
single photon security proof to its full optical implementation, while still providing
similar key rates as those arising from a security proof using the squash model
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assumption. Its main advantage relies on the fact that it can be straightforwardly
applied also to QKD protocols, like the active 6-state protocol, where the squash model,
the other “adaption technique”, does not work.
4. “Plug & Play” configuration
The main feature of the Plug & Play configuration for QKD is that it is intrinsically
stable and polarization independent [14, 43, 44]. Apart from synchronization between
Alice and Bob, no further adjustments are necessary. This fact renders this proposal a
promising approach for commercial QKD systems.
Specifically, in this type of QKD schemes Bob sends to Alice a train of bright laser
pulses through the quantum channel. On the receiving side, Alice first attenuates the
incoming signals to a suitable weak intensity. Afterwards, she codes the secret key
information using phase coding, and sends the resulting weak pulses back to Bob, who
detects them. The main idea behind this bi-directional quantum communication design
is that now the interferometers used in a practical implementation of the scheme are
self-stabilized because the light passes through them twice. Moreover, if the reflection
on Alices side is done by means of a Faraday mirror, then the polarization effects of the
quantum channel can also be compensated.
A full security proof of a Plug & Play system has recently been given in Ref. [73].
However, the security analysis contained in Ref. [73] is based on a slightly modification
of the hardware included in the original Plug & Play proposal. In particular, Alice
performs three measures that enhance the security of the protocol and also simplify
its investigation [73, 74]. First, she blocks any undesired optical mode by means of
an optical filter. Then, she performs active phase randomization. This last action
transforms the incoming signals into a classical mixture of Fock states. Finally, she
measures the photon number distribution of the pulses received in order to estimate
some bounds on the photon number statistics of the output signals. This can be done by
randomly sampling the incoming pulses with an optical switch followed by an intensity
monitor (Case A in Fig. 7). The beam splitter that appears in this figure is used to
implement the decoy state method which improves the whole performance of the scheme.
More recently, a similar proposal has also been analyzed [75]. Basically, it substitutes
the optical switch with a passive beam splitter (Case B in Fig. 7).
In this section, we present very briefly an alternative experimental technique to
estimate the photon number statistics of the output signals. It is based on the
detector decoy idea presented in Sec. 2. Moreover, it allows Alice to perform the
decoy state method simultaneously, i.e., without using an additional variable beam
splitter. The scheme is illustrated in Fig. 7 as Case C. It consists on a balanced Mach-
Zehnder interferometer combined with a threshold detector. After the active phase
randomization step performed by Alice, the signal states entering the interferometer are
given by Eq. 2. Now, the probability that the threshold detector does not click is given
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Figure 7. Case A) Schematic diagram of the detection setup employed by Alice
to estimate the photon number statistics of the output signals. The variable beam
splitter which appears in the figure implements the decoy state method [73]. Case
B) Illustration of a more recent experimental proposal to achieve the same goal [75].
It uses a passive beam splitter together with an intensity monitor. Like before, the
second beam splitter in the figure is used to realize the decoy state method. Case
C) Alternative method based on one balanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer combined
with a threshold detector. PM denotes a phase modulator, M represents a mirror, and
|vac〉 is a vacuum state.
by
pvac(ϕ) =
∞∑
n=0
(
1− cosϕ
2
)n
pn, (49)
where ϕ represents the phase imprinted by the phase modulator of the interferometer.
Like before, if Alice varies, independently and at random for each signal, the phase ϕ
of her setup, then, from the observed probabilities pvac(ϕ), together with the knowledge
of the parameters [(1− cosϕ)/2]n, she can estimate the photon number distribution pn
with high confidence. Given that the probabilities pn are now known, Alice can also
estimate the photon number statistics qn of the output signals. These probabilities are
given by
qn =
∞∑
m=n
m!
n!(n−m)!
pm
2m
(1− cosϕ)n(1 + cosϕ)m−n. (50)
Note that by varying the phase ϕ of her interferometer Alice also modifies simultaneously
the photon number probabilities qn of the output signals, as required in the decoy state
method, without the need of an additional beam splitter to perform this task.
5. Conclusion and outlook
In this paper we have analyzed a simple technique which allows the direct application of
a single photon security proof for quantum key distribution (QKD) to its physical, full
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optical implementation. This so-called detector decoy method is conceptually different
to that of the squash model, the other adaptation mechanism. It is based on an
estimation procedure for the photon number distribution of the incoming light field
that uses only a simple threshold detector in combination with a variable attenuator.
The detector decoy method is similar in spirit to that of the usual decoy state technique:
Since the eavesdropper does not know the particular detection efficiency setting used
to measure the signals, any eavesdropping attempt must leave the expected photon
number distribution unchanged (similar to the conditional channel losses in the decoy
state technique).
Specifically, we have investigated an entanglement based QKD scheme with an
untrusted source where Alice and Bob actively choose the measurement basis of either
the BB84 or the 6-state protocol. The security of both schemes is proven solely by
means of the detector decoy method and without the need of a squash model, which
would have to be proven to be correct for each measurement device anew. Besides,
and opposite to the squash model paradigm, the detector decoy technique allows the
legitimate users to discard double click events from the raw key data. As a result, it
turns out that the secret key rates in the infinite (or sufficiently large) key rate limit
of a BB84 simulated experiment are comparable with each other for both alternatives.
However, the detector decoy idea offers a slightly better performance in those scenarios
where there exists no squash model, like in the 6-state protocol. In any real-life QKD
experiment much more obstacles have to be taken care of and thus the situation can
change quite drastically, mainly because of finite size effects. Nevertheless, for the
current increasing interest in examining the finite size behavior of different protocols,
it can only be of advantage to have a broader spectrum of different proof techniques
available, even if they all show a similar behavior in the asymptotic key rate limit.
Finally, as another potential application of the detector decoy method in QKD, we have
briefly described an experimental procedure to estimate the photon number statistics of
the output signals in a “Plug & Play” QKD configuration. We believe there might be
many other potential applications of this method in QKD, like for instance in Ref. [67].
In addition, it could also be used to estimate the single photon contribution in the two
state protocol with a strong reference pulse [76, 42].
To conclude, let us mention that there might be scenarios where it is not really
necessary to insert and vary the transmittance of an additional beam splitter in
the measurement device. For instance, let us consider the efficient, passive BB84
measurement setup, in which a beam splitter of high transmittance η = 1−∆ splits the
incoming light in favor of one basis versus the other. With this measurement apparatus,
one can obtain directly three different beam splitter settings to apply the detector decoy
formalism: Using the overall “no click” outcome of all detectors gives η1 = 1, whereas
if one ignores all the outcomes of only one basis and looks at the no click outcomes
in the other basis, then one obtains two more settings, η2 = 1 − ∆ and η3 = ∆.
Although these three settings are different from the ones given in Proposition 2.1 they
can still provide good estimations of the single photon contribution. Moreover, the
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method could be improved even further. After all, in showing security we have not used
all available information from our measurement results, as the further occurrences of
double or multiclicks in our detection devices has been ignored. The use of this extra
knowledge can only enhance the estimation procedure and thus can further reduce the
number of necessary detector decoy settings. In fact, it is possible to provide a BB84
security proof by just using an estimation technique [70]. It might be interesting to
compare the detector decoy idea with the results presented in Ref. [70], and we leave
these open questions for further analysis.
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